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D uring the past two decades, trade regimes in Latin America 
have been reformed to facilitate export-led growth, in the expectation 
that the benefits of this growth would eventually trickle down and thereby 
help the poor. These goals have been achieved to differing degrees. Their 
accomplishment has depended not only upon the effectiveness of the trade 
policy reforms but also upon exchange-rate policy, external shocks and 
remittance inflows. Technological change has also been crucial when it 
comes to capitalizing on the benefits of the reforms. These assertions are 
substantiated using simulation results from a computable general equilibrium 
model solved with data for Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras. The 
model is combined with a microsimulation methodology to capture the full 
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After overcoming the debt crisis and stabilizing their 
economies, most Latin American countries initiated 
a process of economic reform. Trade policy reforms, 
consisting chiefly of import liberalization and deliberate 
export promotion, were implemented most rapidly to 
exploit comparative advantages in agriculture and 
some manufacturing sectors. Reforming countries 
expected to achieve rapid export-led growth that would 
ultimately translate into a diminution of poverty.
Even though most Latin American countries 
have opted for fairly similar reforms to their trade 
regimes, their trajectories with regard to export-led 
growth and poverty have been divergent in numerous 
cases. This paper contends that trade policy reforms 
have met their goals in countries which, firstly, have 
been able to maintain competitive and relatively stable 
real exchange rates and, secondly, have become more 
productive. External shocks, originating from global 
price fluctuations and massive inflows of capital and 
workers’ remittances, are viewed here as factors that 
have kept some countries from attaining real exchange-
rate stability and competitiveness. Furthermore, even 
though less costly imports and increased inflows of 
foreign direct investment (fdi) have played an essential 
role in spurring productivity growth during periods of 
trade policy reform, these gains have materialized only 
in countries with relatively abundant skilled labour 
and diversified and modernized export sectors.
The argument of  this paper is substantiated 
with evidence for three Central American countries, 
Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras. Specifically, 
this evidence is gathered by associating simulation 
results from a static computable general equilibrium 
(cge) model solved using data for the three countries 
with actual trends for the period 1990-2003. The cge 
analysis is also complemented by a microsimulation 
methodology implemented using microdata to capture 
the full distributive implications of simulated policy 
and external shocks.
The remainder of  this paper is structured as 
follows. The main trade policy reforms undertaken 
and the socio-economic performance observed in 
the three countries under consideration during the 
1990-2003 period are described in section 2. The 
analytical and methodological aspects of the paper 
are dealt with in section 3. Section 4 is devoted to 
the analysis of cge simulation results, where these 
are associated with observed trends. Lastly, the main 
conclusions and policy implications of the paper are 
summarized in section 5.
 The author is grateful to Ana Sojo, José Cuesta, Matthew Hammill 
and Pablo Sauma for their valuable comments on earlier versions 
of this paper. The views and opinions expressed herein are those 
of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the United 




Trade policy reforms and 
socio-economic performance 
During the past two decades, Costa Rica, El Salvador 
and Honduras, like the rest of Central America, have 
promoted exports and rapidly liberalized imports 
with the aim of achieving high and sustained export-
led growth and, eventually, reducing poverty. These 
countries have instituted special export regimes and 
restructured their export procedures. Temporary tax 
credit certificates were heavily used at one stage to 
subsidize non-traditional exports. Tax exemptions on 
imports of raw materials and capital goods have been 
extended to export producers. Quantitative restrictions 
and import surcharges have been phased out and 
customs procedures simplified. Furthermore, the three 
countries have signed free trade agreements with other 
nations, including one whose other signatories are the 
Dominican Republic and the United States of America 
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(commonly known as cafta-dr), and all of them are 
active members of the World Trade Organization (wto). 
All these reforms have been reflected in a remarkable 
decline in taxes on international trade. Not only have 
import tariff  rates been cut sharply, but export taxes 
have essentially been abolished (figure 1).
The three countries considered here have opted 
for fairly similar trade policy reforms; in fact, they 
have followed the broader Latin American trade policy 
pattern. Their trajectories with regard to export-led 
growth and poverty have been divergent, however. 
Exports have risen in all three countries (table 1), but 
genuine export-led growth has been achieved only in 
Costa Rica (Sánchez and Sauma, 2006). Exports from 
El Salvador did expand considerably in the 1990s, but 
non-tradable sectors seem to have been more important 
engines for the country’s unimpressive economic growth 
(Acevedo, 2004). Exports have grown less rapidly in 
Honduras (Cuesta and Sánchez, 2004).
Export diversification has been a precondition 
of export-led growth. A wide range of agricultural 
and manufacturing goods, some of them produced 
by infant high-tech industries, have gone to make up 
Costa Rica’s export supply. Non-traditional exports 
have expanded impressively in Costa Rica, accounting 
for nearly 80% of merchandise exports in 2000-2003 
(table 1), and are going to a growing number of 
trading partners. Honduras and El Salvador, on the 
other hand, have not treated export diversification as 
a primary goal, but have instead relied more on the 
development of  the drawback industry commonly 
termed the “maquila” industry, which mainly produces 
textiles and clothing for export, especially to the United 
States. By 2000-2003, Honduran non-traditional exports 
were not exceeding 45% of merchandise exports each 
year, whereas maquila exports had risen to more than 
30% of merchandise exports. Non-traditional exports 
from El Salvador have grown, but maquila exports 
FIGURE 1 
Costa rica, El Salvador and honduras: average effective nominal tax rates on 
exports and imports,a 1990-2003
(Percentages)
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of data from the Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean (eclac).










Costa Rica: import tax rate
Honduras: import tax rate
El Salvador: export tax rate
El Salvador: import tax rate
Costa Rica: export tax rate
Honduras: export tax rate
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have contributed more than half  of all merchandise 
exports since 1999.
Trade liberalization has spurred imports but, 
once again, patterns differ (table 1). Imports of raw 
materials and capital goods have increased consistently 
in Costa Rica as export growth has allowed the 
country to build up its capacity to generate foreign 
exchange. In the other two countries, most especially El 
Salvador, imports of intermediate inputs for maquila 
production have soared, and for this reason net maquila 
exports have not been particularly high. As a source 
of foreign exchange, El Salvador and Honduras have 
been more reliant on workers’ remittances, especially 
from the United States, as these have averaged more 
than 62% and 86%, respectively, of the external goods 
and services balance in the years since 1995 (table 1). 
TABLE 1
Costa rica, El Salvador and honduras: macroeconomic indicators, 1990-2003
(Annual averages for the period)
Indicator Country 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2003
Employment (annual growth rate) Costa Rica 2.8 2.8 6.3
 El Salvador 7.6 3.1 3.8
 Honduras 4.6 5.2 -0.5
Goods and services exports Costa Rica 9.2 14.8 1.0
(annual growth rate) El Salvador 13.7 13.0 6.4
 Honduras -0.9 2.7 3.0
Exports of  non-traditional goods Costa Rica 50.5 67.9 79.5
(percentage of  merchandise exports) El Salvador 48.4 34.1 34.8
 Honduras 36.3 42.7 44.0
Exports from drawback industries Costa Rica 13.6 9.0 6.5
(percentage of  merchandise exports) El Salvador 17.5 45.8 57.8
 Honduras 4.8 20.0 31.4
External goods and services balance Costa Rica -5.4 -1.5 -1.8
(percentage of  gdp) El Salvador -14.5 -12.9 -15.3
 Honduras -7.5 -7.7 -15.9
gdp (annual growth rate) Costa Rica 5.4 5.4 3.0
 El Salvador 5.9 3.9 2.1
 Honduras 2.8 2.7 3.6
Goods and services imports Costa Rica 9.9 9.2 2.2
(annual growth rate) El Salvador 20.1 8.8 6.2
 Honduras 3.8 3.4 2.8
Imports of  consumer goods Costa Rica 21.6 20.6 18.7
(percentage of  merchandise imports) El Salvador 26.0 24.2 26.0
 Honduras 21.4 24.9 29.6
Imports of  raw materials and capital goods Costa Rica 78.0 79.4 81.3
(percentage of  merchandise imports)  El Salvador 66.3 56.5 50.2
 Honduras 76.8 71.9 67.9
Imports of  other goods Costa Rica 0.5 0.1 0.0
(percentage of  merchandise imports)a  El Salvador 7.7 19.3 23.8
 Honduras 1.8 3.2 2.5
Net workers’ remittances from abroad Costa Rica -b 13.8 16.0
(percentage of  goods and services trade balance)  El Salvador 70.9 84.8 88.7
 Honduras 58.0 62.0 62.5
Source: estimates on the basis of eclac data, except for remittances and gdp data, which are from the World Bank, World Development 
Indicators [online database] http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/.
a “Other goods” are basically imports for drawback industries (maquila).
b Workers’ remittances from abroad were too small to be accounted for separately in the balance of payments.
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Export growth has put Costa Rica in a position to 
reduce its trade deficit despite rising imports, but the 
same is not true of the other two countries.
In the 1990s, economic growth was 5.4% and 
4.9% per annum in Costa Rica and El Salvador, 
respectively, and just below 3% per annum in Honduras 
(table 1). The first two countries experienced a major 
economic slowdown in 2000-2003 as world prices for 
some of their key export commodities plunged, while 
Honduras was able to sustain its modest growth.1 An 
outstanding trade performance and agricultural growth 
of more than 4% in the 1990s are indications that 
comparatively-advantaged export sectors have been a 
source of economic growth for Costa Rica (Sánchez, 
2004). Yet growth has been fairly evenly balanced in 
Costa Rica, with export-oriented industrial sectors 
and trade-related services also expanding satisfactorily 
(Sánchez and Sauma, 2006). In spite of trade policy 
reforms, non-tradable sectors have paradoxically been 
1 The period of analysis is 1990-2003, but it is worth mentioning that 
the Costa Rican economy recovered during 2004-2005, growing by 
just over 4%. El Salvador also continued to grow in the same period, 
although by little more than 2% per annum. Economic growth in 
Honduras was roughly on a par with that in Costa Rica.
of more fundamental significance for growth in El 
Salvador and Honduras (Acevedo, 2004; Cuesta and 
Sánchez, 2004). Comparatively-advantaged sectors 
have not been boosted by the reforms as expected 
in those two countries; for example, agricultural 
growth has been meagre, particularly in the 1990s 
(Sánchez, 2005).
The incidence of poverty is not as high in Costa 
Rica as in El Salvador and Honduras; even Costa 
Rica’s rural poverty is lower than urban poverty in 
the other two countries (table 2). In the 1990s, the 
evolution of employment and real wages helped reduce 
poverty in Costa Rica and El Salvador (tables 1 and 
2). This trend could not be sustained into the new 
millennium in Costa Rica, as the economy slowed 
down and income distribution as measured by the 
Gini coefficient became more uneven (table 2).2 
Poverty did continue to fall in El Salvador in spite 
of the economic slowdown because, even though real 
2 The level of employment in Costa Rica rose substantially into 
the new millennium even as the economy slowed (table 1). This, 
however, was due to rising informality in the labour market.
TABLE 2
Costa rica, El Salvador and honduras: incidence of poverty, and level and  
distribution of real incomes, selected years of the 1990-2004 period
Country Year
 Real wage per worker  Gini coefficient Incidence of  poverty
  (monthly, US$) of  per capita (percentage of  population 
   income below the poverty line)
 Urban Rural Urban Rural National
Costa Rica 1990 306 207 0.44 24.8 27.3 26.2
 1997 450 327 0.45 19.3 24.8 22.5
 1999 510 337 0.47 18.1 22.3 20.3
 2002 521 355 0.49 17.5 24.3 20.3
 2004 483 341 0.48 18.7 23.1 20.5
El Salvador 1995 197 86 0.51 45.8 64.4 54.2
 1997 252 103 0.51 44.4 69.2 55.5
 1999 281 147 0.52 38.7 65.1 49.8
 2001 272 108 0.53 39.4 62.4 48.9
 2004 259 133 0.49 41.2 56.8 47.5
Honduras 1990 148 55 0.62 69.8 88.0 80.5
 1997 114 60 0.56 72.6 84.2 79.1
 1999 157 87 0.56 71.7 86.3 79.7
 2002 192 72 0.59 66.7 86.1 77.3
 2003 186 60 0.59 62.7 84.8 74.8
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (eclac), Social Panorama of Latin America 2002-2003 (LC/
G.2209-P), Santiago, Chile, 2003. United Nations publication, Sales No.E.03.II.G.185; and Social Panorama of Latin America 2006 
(LC/G.2326-P), Santiago, Chile, 2006. United Nations publication, Sales No.E.06.II.G.133.
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wages by and large decreased, income distribution 
improved as remittances flowed into the country, 
and particularly into rural areas. Since trends in real 
wages and income inequality did not favour the urban 
population, however, the number of urban poor rose. 
In Honduras, on the other hand, employment, real 
wages and income distribution evolved satisfactorily 
on the whole in the 1990s, but poverty showed only a 
modest decline between 1990 and 1999. Developments 
in the labour market became more unfavourable to 
Honduran workers as the new millennium began, 
since income distribution worsened too. Nonetheless, 
inflows of remittances into Honduras favoured the 
poor, even though income distribution worsened 
because remittances went mainly to urban areas, and 
rural workers experienced a greater decline in real 
wages. Only in Honduras was income distribution 
more equal in 2003 or thereabouts than in 1990, and 
there is no clear evidence that this was a result of the 
country’s trade policy reforms.
III
Analytical and methodological issues
Trade policy has been reformed in Central America 
in order to raise the relative prices or profitability of 
exportable goods and services (hereafter, exportables) 
with a view to promoting export-led growth. Export 
promotion policies aim directly at this result. Tariff  
reductions, meanwhile, would be expected to lower 
the cost of imported inputs used in export production, 
i.e., to reduce the price of imported goods and services 
(hereafter, importables) relative to exportables. The 
relative prices of exportables and importables (i.e., 
tradables) would also rise if domestic liberalization led 
to a reduction in the domestic prices of non-tradable 
goods and services (hereafter, non-tradables). 
This kind of  relative price adjustment would 
ultimately affect the relative remuneration of workers 
(i.e., income distribution), as can be concluded from 
the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (hos) framework of 
traditional trade theory and its extensions (Salvatore, 
1995; Evans, 1989; Wood, 1994) or, alternatively, 
from the dependent economy model that comes out 
of the literature on small-open developing economies 
(Cox-Edwards and Edwards, 1994; Edwards, 1988). 
These theories were not in fact formulated to explain 
the poverty effects of trade policy, although the issue 
has recently been studied empirically.3 In addition, 
they tend to overlook the effects that internal and 
external factors other than trade policy can also have 
on relative prices. World price shocks and nominal 
3 See, for example, Ganuza and others (2002 and 2004), Sánchez (2004 
and 2005) and Vos and others (2006), among other studies.
exchange-rate adjustments, for example, affect the prices 
of tradables. Inflows of capital and remittances could 
also affect relative prices through the real exchange 
rate, among other factors.
A shift in relative prices, whether resulting from 
macroeconomic policies or from an external shock, will 
affect consumer prices and hence goods and services 
markets. Shifts in sales revenues and input costs will 
alter the relative profitability of sectors, in response 
to which producers’ investment choices will change. 
Household consumption will probably adjust too, 
although the ultimate effect will depend on other factors 
affecting household income, i.e., the labour market, 
government transfers and remittances from abroad. 
The government may adjust spending in response to 
changes in tax revenue or social policy objectives, 
triggering second-round effects in goods and services 
markets. All these changes will be accompanied by 
supply and demand adjustments in factor markets. 
The ultimate consequences for domestic absorption 
will also depend partly upon the impact on factor 
income and may have feedback effects in the demand 
system by way of further price adjustments.
Producers’ demand for factors will shift as the 
relative profitability of  sectors changes, and this 
will affect the level and possibly the composition of 
labour demand, with repercussions for the level and 
distribution of labour income, especially if  the labour 
supply responds simultaneously. The effects on the 
level and distribution of household income would 
presumably reproduce the changes in labour income, 
but this may not necessarily be the case if  households 
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receive government transfers and remittances, and if  
non-poor households receive non-labour incomes. 
The ultimate impact, primarily upon the level and 
distribution of  household income but also upon 
consumer prices, will determine the capacity of 
households to satisfy their basic consumption needs, 
and hence their level of income poverty.
Macroeconomic adjustments will eventually be 
added to this multiplicity of transmission mechanisms, 
and their interaction will probably also depend on other 
internal factors such as technological change, human 
capital endowments, productivity and so on. A cge 
framework is required to capture most of such a wide 
range of transmission mechanisms and interrelated 
effects, and their ultimate impact on the poor.
A static cge model for each of the three countries 
studied was used to generate simulation results that, 
combined with actual trends, helped to substantiate 
this paper’s assertions. The model shares most of its 
features with the widely used cge model developed 
at the International Food Policy Research Institute 
(ifpri), which is fully explained in Löfgren and others 
(2002).4 This model belongs to the family of neoclassical 
cge models with certain structuralist characteristics, 
developed for trade policy analysis, the theoretical 
foundations for which can be found in Dervis and 
others (1982) and Robinson (1989). It is a model well 
suited to performing analyses of policy and external 
shocks and gauging how these shocks affect relative 
prices and hence the allocation of  resources and 
income distribution. A particular feature of the model 
is the inclusion of imperfect substitution functions 
whereby, given a change in relative prices at given 
elasticity values: (i) the producer substitutes between 
intermediate goods and factors of production, (ii) the 
producer substitutes between factors of production, 
(iii) the producer substitutes between the domestic 
market and exports in the allocation of output, and 
(iv) the consumer substitutes between consumption 
of domestically-produced output and consumption 
of imported goods.
The database for the base-year calibration of each 
country’s cge model comes from a social accounting 
matrix (sam) and elasticity and factor stock data. 
The sam provides the accounting consistency and 
the dimensions of  the model (that is, the number 
of production activities, goods and services, factors 
and institutions). The elasticities, meanwhile, define 
4 Only a few minor changes were introduced with respect to the model 
in Löfgren and others (2002), as detailed in Sánchez (2005).
the degree of substitution as one of the optimization 
problems facing both producers and consumers in 
response to a change in relative prices.
The data for Costa Rica were originally compiled 
in Sánchez (2004) to conduct an analysis of how trade 
reform had affected poverty in the country. Similar 
studies for the trade-poverty nexus have been conducted 
for El Salvador and Honduras, as reported in Ganuza 
and others (2004), and both the sams and the other 
data required have been borrowed from those studies 
for the purposes of  the present one. The sams of 
Costa Rica and Honduras are for 1997 whereas that 
of El Salvador is for 1999, these being the respective 
base years of each country’s cge model.
The sams go into considerable sectoral detail 
(that is, they are broken down into a large number 
of activities and goods and services), with variations 
between the countries reflecting their different 
production structures. The main export products 
are duly identified, whereas sectors that play only a 
fairly small part in the economy are aggregated. All 
other accounts in the sams, dealing with factors and 
institutions, are set up in a more standard way. Labour, 
in particular, is classified according to skill level and 
occupational category. The elasticities are all defined 
at the sectoral level (that is, for both activities and 
goods and services) in order to reflect sector-specific 
behaviour for the producer and the consumer. Even 
though the data inputted into the model necessarily 
differ by country in terms of disaggregation and the 
values given, the simulation results are comparable as 
the model’s functions do not differ by country.
Any typical sam-based cge model provides 
results for inter-group income inequality across 
different groups of households. It would not produce 
any result for intra-group inequality, however, even 
though this is also important in explaining total 
income inequality and poverty. In trying to remedy this 
limitation, each country’s cge model was combined 
with a microsimulation methodology originally 
developed by Almeida dos Reis and Paes de Barros 
(1991) to analyse earnings inequality. This method 
was further developed to analyse per capita household 
income inequality and poverty in a cge framework, 
as explained in Ganuza and others (2002).
The microsimulation methodology essentially 
isolates changes in inequality and poverty due to labour 
market adjustments. The cge model provides a base-
year labour market structure identical to the one that 
would be calculated from the household survey data 
used to calibrate the model and to compute base-year 
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inequality and poverty measures.5 Any cge simulation 
of a policy or external shock can be used to generate 
a counterfactual labour market structure that is then 
imposed in a sequential, top-down fashion on the 
household survey data in order to generate random 
numbers from a normal distribution. This has two 
objectives: first, to determine how many individuals of 
working age change their participation status or move 
from one segment of the labour market to another 
as a result of the situation simulated, and second, to 
assign labour incomes to newly employed individuals 
using the mean income of the decile of the distribution 
to which previously employed workers with identical 
socio-economic characteristics belonged. It is assumed 
that, on average, the effects of the random changes 
correctly reflect the impact of actual changes in the 
labour market. Since labour supply and occupation 
decisions are approximated as largely random processes, 
the microsimulations are repeated several times in 
Monte Carlo fashion to allow construction of 95% 
confidence intervals for the indices of inequality and 
poverty.6 The latter are compared with base-year 
indices of inequality and poverty so that conclusions 
can be drawn. All individuals in the household survey 
database are accounted for in determining the income 
distribution impact.
7 This “neutral” macro closure reduces the risk of erratic swings in 
macro aggregates when simulations cause trade or fiscal balances 
to change substantially.
8 Since no export tax rate was recorded in the El Salvador SAM, 
the export promotion measure for that country was simulated by 
means of a 50% rise in the implicit export price subsidy for non-
traditional agricultural exports (all agricultural exports except 
coffee, cotton, sugar cane and basic grains).
5 The labour market structure, whether for the base-year solution or a 
simulation, is defined by economic participation and unemployment 
rates; employment structure, as defined by sector of  economic 
activity and occupational category; remuneration structure, as 
defined by sector of economic activity; average remuneration in 
the economy; and composition of the employed labour force by 
skill level. For more detail, see Ganuza and others (2002).
6 Endogenous poverty and indigence lines were calculated using 
the price and expenditure systems of the cge model, following the 
procedure spelled out in Sánchez (2005). These lines were used to 
compute poverty indices after each microsimulation, considering 
that policy and external shocks typically affect the prices of basic 
consumer goods and services.
IV
Analysis of simulation results 
Once calibrated and feasibly solved using the General 
Algebraic Modelling System (gams) with data for 
each of  the three countries, the cge model was 
used to conduct various policy and external shock 
simulations. The results are discussed in this section and 
are reported in table 3 as percentage deviations from 
the base-year solution value. Most simulations were 
conducted under a set of initial closure rules designed 
to ensure equilibrium in the different markets covered 
by the cge models. In the factor market, for example, 
quantities allow for an “equilibrium” to be reached 
for capital, unskilled wage labour and self-employed 
labour (unskilled and skilled). The employment 
level of  skilled wage labour is fixed, and the wage 
equilibrates this factor’s market. The difference between 
current government revenues and current government 
expenditures is made up by government savings. The 
current account balance with the rest of the world 
clears through foreign savings, and the exchange 
rate is kept fixed, consistently with the predominant 
exchange-rate regimes of the three countries in the 
base year. Only this external-sector closure rule was 
changed to conduct some simulations. Savings were 
made equal to investment using a “balanced” closure 
rule whereby adjustments in absorption were spread 
proportionally across all its components. Investment 
and government consumption were assumed to be a 
fixed share of base-year nominal absorption and, given 
this specification, the residual share for household 
consumption was also fixed implicitly. The saving 
rates of  households and enterprises were adjusted 
by an equal number of percentage points such that 
aggregate savings equalled aggregate investment.7
1. Trade policy reforms
The trade policy reform that was simulated consists 
of a 50% reduction in import tariffs for all imported 
goods and services (import liberalization) and a 50% 
reduction in export taxes for all exported goods and 
services (export promotion).8 The magnitude of the 
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policy shocks involved was set deliberately high to 
simulate a bold trade policy reform.9 These policy 
shocks were also made to affect all tradable (importable 
and exportable) sectors uniformly to avoid reforming 
protection for some sectors more than others. Since the 
model’s “rest of the world” sector does not distinguish 
trade flows by origin and destination, the simulated 
import liberalization and export promotion policies 
do not discriminate between trading partners. As 
these considerations clearly show, the objective of the 
simulations was to generate comparative static results 
rather than simulate an actual trade agreement.
The results from this trade policy reform simulation 
are fairly consistent with what Costa Rica has 
experienced in reality. Domestic final demand initially 
increases in that country as import liberalization is 
simulated, but subsequently resources are shifted 
rapidly away from domestic market production into 
export sectors in response to the export promotion 
measure. The reduction in supply for the domestic 
market translates into lower domestic absorption. 
Non-tradable production does not contract, however, 
but actually rises more or less in tandem with tradable 
production owing to strong linkages with the export 
sector.10 The simulated export promotion measure 
likewise reduces production for the domestic market 
in El Salvador and Honduras, but in these countries, 
unlike Costa Rica, this does not fully offset the 
benefits from lower tariffs. These results accord 
with the paradoxical fact, referred to above, that 
economic activity in non-tradable sectors has been 
a crucial factor in overall growth during the trade 
policy reforms in El Salvador and Honduras. Output 
increases by 0.6%, 0.2% and 0.8% in Costa Rica, El 
Salvador and Honduras, respectively; yet, again in 
accordance with the actual facts, it is only in Costa 
Rica that production increases more steadily in the 
tradable and non-tradable sectors and that export 
growth is sufficient to reduce the trade deficit. In the 
other two countries, output rises more strongly in 
non-tradable sectors and imports increase by more 
than exports.
Employment increases slightly faster than 
output, especially in Costa Rica, essentially because 
no endogenous linkage between trade policy and 
productivity is modelled. Again, the shift in employment 
is spread more evenly across tradable and non-tradable 
sectors in Costa Rica, and this is partly explained by 
the fact that the export promotion measure encourages 
agricultural employment too. More of  the newly 
employed labour in El Salvador and Honduras goes 
into non-tradable than tradable sectors, essentially 
owing to the prevalent effect of the tariff  cut. This 
seems to determine the final position of wages in the 
two countries, where they rise above their base-year 
values, especially in El Salvador. The wage effect of 
the export promotion measure offsets that of import 
liberalization, partially in Honduras and fully in Costa 
Rica, where there is a small reduction overall. The 
simulated import tariff  reduction unambiguously 
widens the wage gaps between wage earners and self-
employed workers, and between skilled and unskilled 
workers, in all three countries (not shown in table 3). 
Labour income distribution as measured by the Gini 
coefficient worsens in Costa Rica and El Salvador. In 
Honduras, by contrast, the employment adjustment 
leads to a reduction in labour income inequality. The 
export promotion measure reinforces the disequalizing 
effect in Costa Rica because of its impact upon the 
structure of employment by worker type. The opposite 
effect is observed in El Salvador, where the labour 
income gap between skilled and unskilled workers 
narrows when exports are promoted. No major change 
is observed in Honduras in this respect. Taken all 
together, the simulated trade policy reforms worsen 
the distribution of wages in Costa Rica just slightly 
and bring about a small improvement in Honduras, 
while in El Salvador there is little change. These 
distributive effects are broadly reproduced at the per 
capita household income level.
The combination of increased household labour 
incomes and a small drop in basic consumption costs 
leads to a reduction in the incidence of  poverty, 
especially in Costa Rica. Had income distribution not 
deteriorated, the poverty reduction in the simulation 
would have been more substantial for Costa Rica. The 
improvement in income distribution helps to reduce 
poverty in Honduras. The incidence of poverty remains 
basically unchanged in El Salvador, however, where a 
very slight increase in wage inequality seems to weigh 
disproportionately upon that in extreme poverty in 
urban areas. The incidence of poverty falls the most 
in Costa Rica because those living in extreme poverty 
in rural areas are much better off  than in the other 
two countries.
9 Despite the relatively large magnitude of the simulated change to 
trade policy instruments, the models for the three countries remained 
stable after these were applied, and they were feasibly solved.
10 Sánchez (2007) argues that export diversification in Costa Rica 
opened the way to changes in the production structure that have 
ultimately led to the creation of  production linkages between 
sectors.
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As indicated earlier, income inequality in Costa 
Rica rose in 1997-2002 while, by and large, the incidence 
of poverty fell, especially in rural areas (table 2). These 
facts accord with the simulation results.11 Honduras 
undertook trade policy reforms similar to those of 
Costa Rica in the same period, only less rapidly, and 
it witnessed a reduction in the incidence of poverty 
overall, although income inequality worsened between 
1999 and 2002. According to the simulation results, the 
trade policy reforms must have helped to reduce extreme 
poverty in Honduras by way of higher employment 
and wages. However, worsening income distribution 
must have been fully offset by the distributive effect 
of remittance inflows. Trade policy reforms have not 
been leading determinants of income inequality and 
poverty in El Salvador, where inflows of remittances 
have had a more predominant influence. In summary, 
the combination of  simulation results and actual 
events suggests that it is in Costa Rica that trade policy 
reforms have most clearly influenced the evolution of 
poverty and income inequality. In what follows, an 
attempt will be made to explain why.
2. Trade policy reform, exchange rates and 
export competitiveness
As noted earlier, trade policy reforms have been aimed 
at increasing the relative profitability of exports. Various 
external factors have, however, exerted pressure on the 
real exchange rate (rer) to appreciate, thus pushing 
down the relative profitability of exports. These include 
growing inflows of  remittances (table 1), but also 
other private capital flows and fdi, which began to 
be attracted in substantial volumes in the early 1990s 
as capital controls were dismantled, greater economic 
and political stability was achieved and various 
incentives for foreign investors were instituted (table 4).
Furthermore, recurring episodes of global price declines 
for key export goods and services, such as coffee and 
sugar, and skyrocketing oil prices worsened the terms 
of trade for these countries at the beginning of the 
new millennium, thus exerting further pressure on 
the rer (table 4). There is no obvious prospect of a 
sustained reversal in this trend. Some of the Central 
American countries’ key export goods and services 
recently rose in value, but they have been falling back 
again as the world economy slowed down. The prices 
of oil and some imported food staples have continued 
to increase on the whole, despite the slowdown in the 
global economy.
The cge model was also used to simulate a 25% 
increase in capital inflows, a 25% increase in remittances, 
and a 5% drop in the world price of major exports (a 
terms-of-trade shock).12 These are considered external 
shocks for the purposes of the analysis presented in this 
section. The increase in capital inflows was simulated 
by changes to foreign savings, showing them as fixed 
and exogenous, while the current account with the 
12 To simulate the terms-of-trade shock, the world export price 
was changed in the cge models for goods and services accounting 
for about 30% of each country’s total exports (“non-traditional 
agricultural commodities” in Costa Rica, “other services” in 
El Salvador and “food, beverages and tobacco” in Honduras).
11 It is worth recalling at this point that the cge model’s base year 
is 1997 for Costa Rica and Honduras and 1999 for El Salvador.
TABLE 4
Costa rica, El Salvador and honduras: gross private capital
and fdi inflows and net terms of trade, 1990-2003
(Annual averages for the period)
Indicator Country 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2003
Gross private capital inflows (percentage of  gdp) Costa Rica 5.3 8.7 9.2
 El Salvador 1.3 6.2 15.2
 Honduras 6.8 7.5 7.6
Net fdi (percentage of  gdp) Costa Rica 2.7 3.6 3.1
 El Salvador 1.3 2.5 3.5
 Honduras 0.2 2.4 1.9
Net terms of  trade (2000 = 100) Costa Rica 84.9 105.1 100.3
 El Salvador 83.5 113.0 94.5
 Honduras 83.4 103.3 95.1
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators [online database] http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/.
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rest of the world cleared through the exchange rate in 
accordance with the alternative to the original model 
closure. This alternative rule was used to simulate the 
increase in remittances too, since the expectation is 
that they may also have a large effect on the exchange 
rate. The increase in remittances was simulated by 
scaling up transfers from abroad to households in 
the cge model, but the effect on income distribution 
and poverty was analysed in two stages. In the first 
stage, the rise in household income derived from 
remittances was omitted from the microsimulations. In 
other words, the initial analysis of income distribution 
and poverty in the remittances simulation only deals 
with the “pure” relative price effect of remittances 
flowing through the labour market. The “full” effect 
of remittances on income distribution and poverty 
was then analysed in a second stage in which the 
increase in household incomes was included in the 
microsimulations.
The three external shocks that were simulated 
lead to a large appreciation of  the rer (table 3). 
Resources are allocated away from tradable sectors into 
non-tradable ones because of the relative price effect. 
Domestic absorption rises as a result, but production 
barely increases because the trade balance deteriorates 
and tradable production is adversely affected relative 
to non-tradable production, the exception being the 
terms-of-trade shock in Honduras.13
Employment shrinks most in tradable sectors, 
especially agriculture, although some of the simulations 
also show lower employment in non-tradable sectors 
in Costa Rica and Honduras. Increased recruitment 
in non-tradable sectors in El Salvador offsets 
lower employment in tradable sectors, so that total 
employment either increases slightly or remains virtually 
unchanged. The fall in domestic prices triggered by 
rer appreciation pushes wages down, except in Costa 
Rica in all three simulations and El Salvador when 
higher capital inflows are simulated, since these are 
situations where higher demand for skilled wage earners 
in non-tradable sectors ultimately pushes wages up. 
The upsurge in non-tradable sectors translates into 
larger wage gaps between wage earners and the self-
employed, and between skilled and unskilled workers, 
except in the case of the El Salvador terms-of-trade 
shock. As a result, income distribution as measured 
by the Gini coefficient worsens very slightly. The effect 
on poverty is more ambiguous. The total incidence of 
poverty rises in Costa Rica overall as labour incomes 
drop in rural areas, except when remittances are 
increased, as these reduce the numbers living in extreme 
poverty, particularly in rural areas. The upsurge in 
non-tradable sectors unambiguously reduces extreme 
poverty in Costa Rica’s urban areas. In El Salvador, 
raising capital inflows, including remittances, leads 
to a modest reduction in total and extreme poverty 
as a consequence of  the redistributive impact of 
labour market changes in non-tradable sectors. There 
is a reduction in extreme poverty in Honduras too, 
particularly in rural areas, but this is explained by the 
downward pressure on food prices. The terms-of-trade 
shock proves somewhat detrimental in terms of the 
incidence of poverty in El Salvador and Honduras 
owing to its effects on household income, which tend 
to be most severe for the poorest.
The simulation results indicate that, on the 
whole, inequality and poverty are weakly explained 
by the simulated increase in capital inflows, including 
remittances, and the unfavourable terms-of-trade shock. 
However, the effect of remittances deserves more in-
depth examination since, as indicated earlier, only the 
“partial” impact arising through the operation of the 
labour market alone has been analysed. When transfers 
to households are also taken into consideration in the 
microsimulations, the impact on income inequality 
and poverty is much more noticeable in El Salvador 
and Honduras, where remittances account for a large 
share of the trade balance (table 1). As figure 2 shows, 
the distribution of  per capita household income 
improves markedly in El Salvador, where the bulk 
of remittances flow to rural areas, but deteriorates 
in Honduras, where most remittances go to urban 
households. The numbers of people living in moderate 
and extreme poverty fall sharply, but this effect is 
much more marked in El Salvador on account of the 
improvement in income distribution. The results for 
Costa Rica are not reported here because they were 
very close to zero, the reason being that the scale of 
remittances was substantially smaller there than in the 
other two countries in the model base year.14
14 Even today, the scale of remittances remains much smaller in 
Costa Rica. According to the World Bank, World Development 
Indicators 2006, net worker remittances from abroad were equivalent 
to 19.1%, 93.8% and 96.3% of the goods and services trade balance 
in Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras, respectively.
13 More atypically, the simulated terms-of-trade shock reduces non-
tradable production in Honduras by almost 1%. This is because 
the simulated increase in the world price of food, beverages, and 
tobacco discourages production of those goods for the domestic 
market, and domestic demand for domestically produced goods 
and imports falls as a result.
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The relative price effect of  remittances on 
production is found to be negligible and the impact 
on income distribution and poverty is essentially 
explained by the boost to household incomes from direct 
transfers.15 This result may indicate that El Salvador 
and Honduras lack the capacity to absorb remittance 
inflows productively and that the export sector in 
those countries is seriously affected by the resulting 
appreciation of the rer. Should these circumstances 
persist over time in El Salvador and Honduras, where 
remittances are still growing systematically, those 
countries may end up suffering from what Sánchez 
(2005) calls “remittance disease”.
The implications of rer appreciation are important 
for the relative success of trade policy reforms, as is 
indicated by the results of a new simulation combining 
FIGURE 2
El Salvador and honduras: “full” effect of a 25% increase
in remittances on inequality and povertya
(Percentage deviation from base-year value)
Source: cge models and microsimulations.
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15 This conclusion still holds if  the initial model closure rule (fixed 
exchange rate and current account with the rest of  the world 
balanced through foreign savings) is maintained.
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these reforms with external shocks.16 The appreciation 
of the exchange rate, basically triggered by the external 
shocks, boosts consumption, investment and imports 
in comparison with the situation in which trade 
policy reforms are unaccompanied by other external 
shocks. The exception is Honduras, where agricultural 
production for domestic consumption suffers severely 
as a result of declining economic activity in export 
manufacturing, all of  which translates into lower 
output. In this case, rural household consumption 
falls, government consumption expands only slightly, 
and the effect upon production discourages imports 
as compared to the scenario of trade policy reforms 
alone. Exports, particularly agricultural ones, are 
discouraged in all three countries and the trade deficit 
deteriorates. Production does not plummet in Costa 
Rica or El Salvador, however, as resources withdrawn 
from export sectors are promptly reallocated to non-
tradable production. 
The favourable labour market effects of the trade 
policy reforms are offset by the external shocks, partially 
in Costa Rica and El Salvador, fully in Honduras. 
Both employment and wages decline in Honduras, 
particularly in tradable sectors. Total employment 
increases by less in Costa Rica than in the situation 
in which external shocks are absent, but wages end up 
rising because skilled workers are in greater demand 
in non-agricultural sectors. By contrast, there is new 
employment for workers of all types in non-tradable 
sectors in El Salvador, but the reduction in domestic 
prices brought about by the appreciating exchange 
rate lowers the average wage by comparison with the 
scenario in which external shocks are absent. Exchange-
rate appreciation also somewhat magnifies the effect 
of tariff  reductions upon income distribution in the 
three countries, and generally cancels out the reduction 
of poverty recorded in Costa Rica and Honduras in 
the absence of external shocks. In contrast, poverty 
now diminishes somewhat in El Salvador as a result 
of the upsurge in non-tradable sectors.
rer appreciation has actually taken place in 
Honduras and El Salvador (figure 3) and, if  the 
simulation results are to be believed, this must have 
offset the expected effects of the trade policy reforms. 
El Salvador opted for a fixed exchange-rate regime 
in 1993 and dollarized its economy in 2001, during 
which time its rer appreciated substantially. It is 
unsurprising, therefore, that El Salvador has been 
transformed from an agro-export economy into a 
services economy (Segovia, 1998). Non-tradable 
sectors have driven economic growth in El Salvador, 
especially in the 1990s. In the case of Honduras, daily 
interventions in the currency market since 1994 have 
proved insufficient to prevent rer appreciation. The 
country’s unimpressive economic performance has been 
underpinned by temporary increases in investment 
and government consumption since the 1990s (Cuesta 
and Sánchez, 2004). In Costa Rica, by contrast, a 
managed regime of  periodic mini-devaluations of 
the local currency against the dollar has allowed a 
relatively stable and competitive real exchange rate 
to be maintained (figure 3).17 Thus, only in Costa 
Rica has exchange-rate policy proved consistent with 
the objectives of the trade policy reforms, since the 
country’s mini-devaluations have helped to raise the 
relative profitability of exports.
Devaluation reinforces the effects of the trade 
policy reforms. The relative profitability of exports is 
found to rise sharply when the simulated trade policy 
reforms are combined with a 2.5% devaluation of the 
exchange rate (table 3).18 Exports increase significantly 
at the cost of lower investment in non-tradable sectors, 
but only in Costa Rica do they boost gdp substantially 
by comparison with the scenario of  trade policy 
reforms alone (table 3). gdp falls in Honduras, not 
only because non-tradable production contracts but 
also because the devaluation increases production 
costs in a poorly diversified and unproductive export 
sector. Cuesta and Sánchez (2004) identify other cge 
transmission mechanisms whereby devaluation has 
contractionary effects in Honduras.
The simulated devaluation reinforces the 
employment effect of  the trade policy reforms in 
Costa Rica and El Salvador, as tradable sectors hire 
more workers, albeit at the cost of lower recruitment 
in non-tradable sectors. In Honduras, employment 
falls across all sectors as a result of the contractionary 
17 A new managed regime with upper and lower bands was put in 
place in Costa Rica in 2007.
18 This simulation was performed using the initial closure rule 
whereby the exchange rate is fixed and the current account with 
the rest of the world is balanced through foreign savings.
16 The exchange rate was assumed to be flexible (and foreign savings 
fixed) for this new simulation, even though the contrary had been 
assumed initially when simulating the trade policy reforms alone. 
In an experimental simulation using a flexible exchange rate that is 
not reported here, the trade policy reforms resulted in only a very 
marginal exchange-rate appreciation, and the resource allocation 
and income distribution and poverty effects remained essentially 
the same as when the exchange rate was assumed to be fixed (and 
foreign savings flexible).
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effect of the devaluation. The devaluation pushes up 
domestic prices, leading to lower real wages in most 
cases. Nonetheless, the employment effect reinforces 
the poverty reduction observed in Costa Rica and El 
Salvador following the application of the trade policy 
reforms alone, although the effect is only marginal 
given that the prices of  basic consumption goods 
and services rise. The poverty effect of devaluation is 
contrary to that of the trade policy reforms in Honduras 
on account of the contractionary effect referred to 
and the reduction of real wages. The disequalizing 
effect of the trade policy reforms is more than offset 
by the devaluation in Costa Rica and El Salvador, 
as the relative demand for skilled labour declines. In 
Honduras, the additional income distribution effect 
from devaluation as compared to trade policy reforms 
alone is virtually nil.
The simulation results and actual developments 
discussed so far indicate that only in Costa Rica has 
exchange-rate policy had the effect of  reinforcing 
the benign effects of  the trade policy reforms and 
offsetting the harmful effects of external shocks on 
export growth and poverty reduction. In the other two 
countries just the opposite has occurred, with exchange 
rate appreciation offsetting the effects of trade policy 
reforms on export growth and poverty.
3. Trade policy reform and productivity
The success of the trade policy reforms must also have 
been determined by the extent to which they have 
been accompanied by productivity growth. According 
to a decomposition of labour productivity changes 
presented in Sánchez (2005), Costa Rican workers 
became more productive in the economy generally 
during the 1990s and in agriculture, in particular, in 
1990-2003. The same decomposition indicates that the 
evolution of labour productivity growth has been less 
satisfactory in El Salvador and Honduras, with the 
possible exception of El Salvador’s industrial sector. 
Labour productivity has of course depended on the 
availability of human capital. The percentage of the 
economically active population aged 15 or over with 
more than 10 years of instruction is considerably higher 
in Costa Rica than in El Salvador and Honduras, 
particularly in rural areas, as it stood at 19.6% there 
around 2002, for example, compared with 8.9% and 
4%, respectively, in the other two countries (eclac, 
2004). Imports of raw materials and capital goods 
have led to the absorption of improved technologies 
and better use of  skilled labour in Costa Rica, 
even in agriculture (Sánchez, 2004). In El Salvador 
and Honduras, on the other hand, production in
FIGURE 3
Costa rica, El Salvador and honduras: nominal and real exchange rates, 1985-2005
(Indices 1995 = 100)
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non-tradable sectors and in the maquila industry has 
been dominated by low-paid, low-skilled employment, 
hampering the achievement of sustained productivity 
growth through technological change.
Dynamic gains from trade are not endogenized 
in the cge models, and total factor productivity 
(tfp) growth is exogenous. There is little empirical 
evidence regarding the drivers of  trade-induced 
efficiency gains in the three countries. However, the 
final simulation in this paper is designed to achieve 
a better understanding of  the effect of  the trade 
policy reforms when accompanied by productivity 
growth. The trade policy reforms were also simulated 
in tandem with a productivity shock consisting of a 
5% increase in tfp that is hypothetically driven by a 
matching 5% increase in fdi and the relative supply 
of skilled labour.
The simulated productivity shock causes little 
variation in domestic prices but does give a remarkable 
boost to output, to which domestic absorption responds 
rapidly. On the whole, it reinforces the favourable 
allocative effects of  the trade policy reforms and 
offsets the unfavourable ones (table 3). The modest 
employment growth that is triggered by the trade policy 
reforms alone becomes fairly substantial, especially 
in El Salvador and Honduras, where production 
dynamics lag farther behind. There is a much larger 
decline in poverty as a result, especially in Costa 
Rica, where extreme poverty falls dramatically. The 
reduction in poverty is far more modest in the other 
two countries, but the results and actual trends suggest 
that it is productivity and human capital shortfalls 
that have prevented those countries from experiencing 
poverty alleviation during the implementation of the 
trade policy reforms. There are also some undesirable 
effects from the productivity shock. Real wages 
decrease in Honduras as a result of a more atypical 
increase in the price of non-tradable goods (relative 
to exportables). In addition, the productivity shock 
magnifies the disequalizing effect of  the simulated 
trade policy reforms in Costa Rica and El Salvador, 
something that does not happen in Honduras owing 
to the impact of labour force recomposition. This last 
result suggests that a reduction of income inequality 
in Honduras will necessarily require substantially 
increased human capital investment. By contrast, the 
relatively large and growing stock of skilled labour 
in Costa Rica has helped that country offset part of 
the negative distribution effects of the trade policy 
reforms and productivity growth.
V
Conclusions and policy implications
This paper’s main conclusions have been drawn by 
combining simulation results from a computable 
general equilibrium model with actual data for the 
period 1990-2003. It has been found that trade policy 
reforms in Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras have 
unquestionably favoured the relative profitability of 
export sectors. Export-led growth and its trickle-down 
effects on the poor have been experienced only in Costa 
Rica, however, essentially for three reasons.
Firstly, Costa Rica’s export sector has modernized 
and diversified to a remarkable degree, enabling the 
country to build up its capacity to generate foreign 
exchange and to absorb unfavourable price shocks more 
successfully. El Salvador and Honduras, on the other 
hand, have opted for greater specialization in maquila 
production, which adds little value to the economy 
owing to its extremely large import content.
Secondly, the inflows of remittances and private 
capital, and to a lesser extent the recurrent drops in 
world prices for key exports, have led to an appreciation 
of the real exchange rate in El Salvador and Honduras, 
offsetting the effect of the trade policy reforms on the 
relative profitability of export sectors. In Costa Rica, 
where remittances are less of  a factor but inflows 
of private capital and fdi have exerted pressure on 
the real exchange rate, managed devaluations were 
successfully used to maintain a stable and competitive 
real exchange rate, and this has proved crucial when 
it comes to capitalizing upon the expected effects of 
the trade policy reforms.
Thirdly, Costa Rica has taken advantage of fdi 
and its increased capacity to generate foreign exchange 
in order to absorb technologies that, combined 
with a relatively large stock of skilled labour, have 
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boosted labour productivity, even in agriculture. In 
El Salvador and Honduras, by contrast, a lack of 
dynamism in tradable sectors, very little diversification 
in agriculture and increased reliance on maquila 
production employing traditional technologies have 
all translated into higher demand for unskilled labour 
and low generation of value added.
Trade policy reforms have worsened the distribution 
of income in Costa Rica but poverty has fallen because 
the rural population, in particular, has benefited 
from stronger export growth. These trade policy 
reforms alone go only a little way towards explaining 
the poverty and income inequality trends observed 
in El Salvador and Honduras. Remittance inflows 
have unambiguously reduced poverty in those two 
countries, but income distribution has improved 
substantially only in El Salvador, where most recipients 
of remittances live in rural areas. In Honduras, by 
contrast, remittances mainly flow into urban areas, 
leaving the rural population relatively worse off.
Remittances have increased the consumption 
capacity of households in El Salvador and Honduras 
and have caused resources to be reallocated from 
tradable to non-tradable sectors, but they have barely 
boosted total production. This inertia in terms of 
production capacity and further appreciation of 
the real exchange rate may persist in the longer run, 
since remittances will probably continue to flow 
into these countries. This “remittance disease” may 
further constrain the creation of production capacity 
to generate employment over time, particularly in 
export sectors.
These conclusions call for policy action if  these 
countries, especially El Salvador and Honduras, are to 
be able to increase the relative profitability of exports 
during trade liberalization under the aegis of cafta-
dr and other trade agreements. Export diversification, 
technological change, human capital investment and 
productivity growth are preconditions for reaping the 
welfare gains from further trade liberalization. Export 
diversification, in particular, should be considered a 
priority because it reduces exposure to export price 
shocks that undermine the intended effects of trade 
liberalization. Policies will be needed to offset upward 
pressure on the real exchange rate from rising remittance 
inflows and the terms-of-trade deterioration that is 
expected to occur as demand for export goods and 
services declines in a slowing world economy marked 
by stubbornly high oil prices. The challenge will be to 
devise export promotion policies that are allowable 
under wto rules and do not put public finances at 
risk. Costa Rica and Honduras can still resort to 
exchange-rate policy, but El Salvador cannot so long 
as its economy remains dollarized. The development 
of profitable remittance investment schemes will be 
crucial in countries like El Salvador and Honduras, 
particularly if such schemes are successful in boosting 
export production and employment.
(Original: English)
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